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ABSTRACT 
Although the relationship between pay and performance in baseball 
has been convincingly demonstrated by Scully, a number of unresolved 
questions remain. Using a large sample of player salaries from 
contracts on file at the American League office, new estimates of this 
relationship are reported. The primary findings are as follows. 
First, while Scully'• basic results are qualitatively robust , the 
salary elasticities for various performance and experience variables 
are substantially lower for our sample and specification . Second, for 
most variables, recent performance, as well as career average, 
contributes to the explanation of salary differences. Third, expansion 
has a significant effect on salary structure , and, in our model, makes 
it statistically invalid to estimate a single salary equation from 
pooled time-aeries data that includes an expansion year. 
PAY AND PERFORMANCE IN BASEBALL: 
MODELING REGULARS, RESERVES, AND EXPANSION 
Rodney D. Fort and Roger G. Noll 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The labor market for professional baseball players has been 
extensively studied and the connection between the performance of 
athletes and their salaries convincingly demonstrated. The theoretical 
argument relating pay and performance can be suDDDarized as follows. If 
teams maximize profits, choosing all inputs except player talent 
competitively, then players will earn their marginal revenue products 
net of monopeony rents accruing to the teams. 1 Marginal revenue 
products are then represented in empirical specifications by euDDDary 
performance measures such as batting average or earned run average. 
The derived demand for player inputs is a function of player 
performance. 
Gerald Scully'e (1974) definitive study demonstrates that most of 
the variation in observed player salaries can be explained by a handful 
of player productivity variables. While impeccable in both theoretical 
treatment and empirical technique, Scully'e study (like all other work 
in the area) relies upon salary data of questionable accuracy that are 
gleaned from popular publications. Moreover, the players reported in 
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such sources are not representative of the population of major­
leaguers. Popular sources are much more likely to publish information 
about well-known players than about the journeymen who comprise the 
bulk of any major-league roster. Thie sampling bias raiee1 questions 
about whether the pay and performance relationship previously 
discovered holds true for players of lesser abilities and lower 
salaries . 
Another issue pertains to the effect of changes in induetry 
structure on salaries . For example, Scully's data were from 1968 and 
1969 .  The latter was an expansion year, when two new teams were 
admitted to the American League. Two more teams joined the National 
League in 1970. For reasons discussed herein, expansion should cause a 
change in the relationship between salary and performance, raising the 
possibility that pooling observations over a period of substantial 
structural change is not an acceptable procedure. 
In this paper, we report the results of an analysis of salaries 
from a player sample that is dramatically different from those used in 
past studies. The data were collected by agents of the Internal 
Revenue Service and employees of the American League off ice under our 
general direction , in connection with Selig XL U . S. ,  no . 81-C-334 (U . S .  
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin) , and cover 461 
observations directly from player contracts for the years 1968, 1969, 
and 1970. These data were painstakingly verified by the Internal 
Revenue Service since they were used in litigation. The 1alary 
observations are accurate to the level of the thoroughness of the 
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Internal Revenue Service . 
The major findings are as follows. First, our data are 
substantially different than those in Scully's sample, and are probably 
more representative of the population of interest. Second, when 
Scully's model i• estimated using our data, substantial ly leas of the 
total variation in salaries is explained and some important differences 
emerge in the estimations. Third , our new specification of the salary 
model increaaes its explanatory power for our sample to roughly the 
level achieved by Scully on his sample. Finally, we find statistical 
evidence that a change in industry structure does have a significant 
effect on player salaries . Therefore, observations on marginal players 
that span an expansion cannot be pooled. 
II. COMPARING THE DATA SETS 
The data made available to us were based on trades or sales where 
at least one of the parties to the transaction was an American League 
team . Associated with each transaction are the name(s) of the 
player(s) subject to the transaction, the teams involved, the 
transaction date , and the terms of the transaction . Salaries were 
reported in the following way. At the very least, the salary was 
reported for every player during the season in which the transaction 
occurred .  Usually the salaries for one season prior and one season 
after the transaction were also included, and occasionally additional 
years were reported . 
Table l shows the comparison between Scully's and our data . 
TABLE l 
Comparison of Scully and Fort-Noll Data 
Characteristic 
Number of Observations: Total 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Multiple Observations on Same Player 
1968 and 1969, not 1970 
1969 and 1970, not 1968 
1968 and 1970, not 1969 
1968, 1969, and 1970 
Annual Observations involving 
Sale or Trade (%) 
Annual Observations in 
American League (%) 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Salary Range ($ thousands) 
Mean Salary ($) 
Salary Observations under $25,000 (%) 
Mean Years of Experience 
Hitters 
Pitchers 
Mean Playing Time per Season 
Hitters (At Bats) 
Pitchers (Innings Pitched) 
a Reported by Scully (1974, pp. 926-7) .  
Scully8 
148 
87 
67 
41 
10-125 
48,100 
23 
8 
6 
385 
207 
4 
Fort-No ll 
461 
116 
166 
179 
63 
57 
6 
22 
41 
55 
42 
73 
80 
76  
4-90 
22 ,390 
66 
6 
6 
261 
106 
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Scully's sample clearly is comprised primarily of veteran "regulars"--
players who are usually in the starting lineup. For example, for 
pitchers the sample mean number of innings pitched is approximately the 
amount of work expected from a starter who is in the regular rotation, 
pitching every four or five days, and is far greater than even the beat 
relief pitchers would be expected to pitch. For hitters, the average 
number of at bats in a season for all major-league players (other than 
pitchers) is approximately half the mean in Scully's sample. The mean 
salary in Scully'a sample is about $6,000 higher than the mean for 
veteran ballplayers during the period. 
By contrast, our sample of players contains a much larger 
proportion of mediocre players, judged on experience and playing time. 
Further, although the two data sets exhibit the same range of salaries, 
our players were paid substantially less on average. Although precise 
information is not available on the issue, our sample mean is closer to 
the average for all players on the forty-man major-league roster, from 
which the sample was taken.2 
All-in-all, our sample appears generally representative.3 But 
even if it is not (i.e. neither Scully's nor our sample is judged 
generally representative), the two samples are substantially different. 
The importance of this difference is revealed when Scully's salary 
model is estimated on each of the two data sets.4 The results are 
reported in Table 2. The 1968 and 1969 data from our sample are used 
in one estimation to facilitate comparison with Scully's original 
findings and the results for the entire 1968-1970 sample are also 
TABLE 2 
Estimation of the Scully Salary Hodel 
For both Samples8 
Variable 
I. Hitters 
At Bat Shareb 
Slugging Avea
c 
Banjo Hitter 
Marginal Attendfnce
e 
Population 1970 
Experienceg 
National Leagueh 
Constant 
R2 
II. Pitchers 
Scully Sample 
(1968-9) 
.275 (3.10) 
l.072 (4.76)
.058 (l.61) 
.265 (2.81) 
-.062 (0.78) 
.522 (7 .53) 
.019 (0.62) 
.670 (0.82) 
.81 
Innings Pitched Sharei .970 (4.22) 
Power Pitching Ratiol .808 (4.00) 
Marginal Attendfnce
e -.062 (0.61) 
Population 1970 -.053 (0.53) 
Experienceg .502 (7.70) 
National Leagueh .007 (0.20) 
Constant 3.385 (4.16) 
R2 .78 
Fort-Noll 
Sample 
(1968-9) 
.273 ( 5 .38) 
.481 (2.44) 
.006 (0.06) 
.101 (l .82) 
.103 (2.22) 
.297 (5.61) 
.055 co. 72) 
9 .206 ( 13 .07) 
.68 
.276 (4.88) 
.235 (2 .26) 
.070 (l .34) 
.057 ( 1.09) 
.277 (6.10) 
-.044 (0.52) 
9.181 (13.02) 
.59 
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Fort-Noll 
Sample 
(1968-70) 
.27 4  (7.19) 
.373 (2.75) 
-.063 (0.85) 
.125 (3 .07) 
.068 (l. 91) 
.300 (7 .54) 
.006 (0.11) 
9.26 (17.37) 
.67 
.385 (7 .96) 
.108 ( 1.32) 
.087 ( 2 .02) 
.004 (0.09) 
.289 (7 .78) 
-.082 ( l .32) 
9.876 (16.55) 
.64 
a. The dependent variable is the natural log of player salary. All 
independent variables are in logs except, of course, for dummy 
variables. The Scully results are from the 1974 paper, pp. 926-7.
All reports are for the indicated pooled sample. In the Fort-Noll 
sample, player histories were compiled from the Official Baseball 
Register and The Baseball Encyclopedia. A number of Fort-Noll 
observations are not included in the applications of Scully'• model 
shown in this Table. The reaaons are that (1) the marginal attendance 
variables for expansion teams (1970) could not be calculated and 
(2) players we distinguish later as Hopefuls are not included. 
The t-statistica are reported in parentheaea. 
TABLE 2 (cont'd) 
b. The fraction of bis team's total at bats accounted for by the 
player, on average, for all hie years in the major leagues. 
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c. Lifetime total bases from safe hits divided by official lifetime at 
bats. 
d. A dummy variable equal to one if the player is an above-league­
average hitter and below-league-average slugger, zero otherwise. 
e. The estimated effect of win percentage on annual attendance, from a 
regression for each major-league team. Because Scully'e actual 
numbers were unavailable at the time this project was undertaken, the 
effect waa estimated independently here as ezplained (but not reported) 
by Scully (1974). The coefficient estimates in Table 2 for this 
variable may not be strictly comparable. 
f. Reported by SMSA, �of the Census, used in millions. 
g. Humber of years that the player's name appears on a major-league 
roster. 
h. A dummy variable equal to one if the salary observation pertains to 
a year in which the player was on a National League roster, zero 
otherwise. 
i. The fraction of his team's total innings pitched accounted for by 
a pitcher, on average, during hie major-league career. 
j. The pitcher's lifetime ratio of etikeoute to walks. 
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reported. A number of results deserve mention: (1) R2 ia much higher 
for Scully'a sample, for both the hitter and pitcher equations; (2) all 
variables that are statistically significant for Scully'a original 
sample are also significant for our sample, ezcept that the dummy 
variable distinguishing bitter• with high batting average but low 
slugging average (banjo hitters) ia marginally aignificant in Scully'a 
sample but insignificant in ours; (3) every variable that Scully found 
statistically important is closer to zero in absolute magnitude in the 
regression for our data, and in moat cases, these differences are 
large; (4) the variables related to market size (population and 
Scully'a estimated marginal effect of winning on attendance) appear to 
contribute to the salary ezplanation from our sample but not Scully'a.5 
From these observations, we conclude that Scully'• model is 
qualitatively robust; the important variables in bis model retain their 
significance for a completely different sample. Nevertheless, the 
differences in the regressions suggest that (1) Scully'a model may be 
misspecified in terms of functional form, and (2) the process by which 
salaries are determined for mediocre players, who are represented only 
in our sample, may be substantially different than the process for the 
more established veterans that comprise Scully's sample. 
III. ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
Given the preceding regression comparison, a number of plausible 
respecificatione suggest themselves. All previous attempt• at widening 
the repertoire of performance variables have reached the same 
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conclusion: the variables are ao highly correlated that, once a few 
are included, more variables provide little by way of added 
explanation.6 Nonetheless, one potentially important independent 
variable ia missing from the pitching equation: whether the pitcher is 
a starter or fulfills a relief role. The ratio of starting appearances 
to total appearance• ia included in an attempt to capture the 
difference between types of pitchers. Because innings pitched gives 
undue weight to starters, correcting for starting appearances should 
lower the value of starters relative to relievers. Renee, the starter 
ratio should have a negative sign. 
Our sample contains several young, marginal players with little or 
no major-league experience. Career major-league performance records 
are presumably leas meaningful ability indicators for these players 
than for more experienced veterans. Two duoany variables were used to 
account for the lower end of the experience and performance range: 
"Rookie" indicates that an observation was for a player in his f irat 
major-league season, and "Hopeful" indicates that the observation 
pertained to a player with leas than five years experience and fewer 
than forty at bats (thirty innings pitched) in each season spent on a 
major-league roster if a hitter (pitcher) . Hence, a player in his 
first year, who did not meet the at bats or innings pitched cutoff in 
that year, is treated as a Hopeful. 
Another refinement is to account for the possibility that recent 
performance receives different weight than career performance in the 
salary process. For variables that measure playing time Cat bats and 
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innings pitched), a substantial change from historical averages can 
occur because of injuries that actually have no bearing on a player's 
long run abilities. Poor players may get more playing time in a given 
season due to an injury to a regular in the starting lineup, or a 
starting regular may be out of the lineup temporarily due to an injury 
that is not permanently disabling. Concerning other performance 
measures, a player may be detectably improving or declining so that 
more recent data better indicate his productivity to a team. Hence, we 
include variables that measure the extent to which performance 
indicators in the year preceding the salary observation depart from 
career averages for the player. 
The techniques just described pose some problems of estimation. 
First, having defined a major-league season aa greater than forty at 
bats for hitters or thirty innings pitched for pitchers, players 
defined as "Hopefuls" are treated aa having no performance data. 
Hence, natural logarithns of these variables are undefined. To cope 
with this problem, all performance variables were measured aa one plus 
the actual value.7 Aa explained below, this transformation substantially 
af fecta the estimates of the salary elasticities for the tranaf ormed 
independent variables. Second, rookies have only one year of history, 
ao that calculating departures from average yields meaningless zeroes. 
Departure variables for established players who were absent from the 
majors in the year prior to a salary observation (say, due to injury or 
a stint in the minor leagues), likewise are misleading. To handle 
cases of established players absent from the major leagues in the prior 
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season, ve constructed the dummy variable "No Last Year. " Then, for 
Hopeful, Rookie, and No Last Year observations, the logarithm of 
departure variables vas simply set equal to zero. 
Finally, more refined measures of major-league experience and 
"banjo hitting" were devised. For the former, the effects of age and 
experience were separated. We expect that age does not enter the 
salary equation linearly in logarithms. Instead, age has a more 
pronounced effect in the early and late years than in the middle of a 
player's career. Accordingly, age vas entered as a deviation from the 
mean, and separated for players of above average (Old Age) and below 
average (Young Age) maturity. The square of these deviations from the 
mean age vas also included to detect nonlinear effects. Furthermore, 
because age and experience are obviously highly correlated, one more 
adjustment vas made. First, years of experience vas regressed on age, 
and an expected amount of experience was calculated for each player. 
The difference between expected and actual experience vas entered for 
each player as the independent effect of experience that vas not 
already accounted for by age. We expect this experience residual to be 
inversely related to salary because experience is thought to improve 
performance, especially early in a player's career; for two players of 
equal age, the player with more experience can be expected to perform 
better. This should result in a negative sign for the Positive 
Experience Residual variable while the opposite is expected for the 
Negative Experience Residual variable. 
To deal with banjo hitters, we regressed slugging average on 
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batting average, finding the expected strong correlation. As with 
experience, the difference between predicted and actual slugging 
average C Positive or Negative Slugger Residual) vas used to measure 
the extent to which a player vas truly a slugger. 
Estimation results of this respecification for the aample period 
1968-1970 are shown in Table 3. Model I is the initial attempt to 
include all of the ideas just described while Model II drops those 
notions which yielded no added explanation. Note that hitters and 
pitchers are reported in a single equation with a dummy variable 
distinguishing the two (Pitcher). The common variables related to 
experience shoved no statistically detectable difference for hitters 
and pitchers in any of the respecified regressions, or for that matter 
in Scully's model applied to our data. Also, measures of market 
effects (population and marginal attendance) have been dropped. 
Indeed, the market effects variables were always insignificant in the 
respecified regressions (including some unreported results) which vas 
cause for their subsequent omission. This is consistent with the 
profit-maximizing theory of the operation of sports teams. 
In Table 3, the respecification produced significant and plausible 
results. For hitters and pitchers, the performance variables proposed 
by Scully (At Bats and Innings Pitched Shares, Slugging Average and 
Power Pitching Ratio) all retain their significance. All of these 
measures have higher t-values in our Model II (Table 3) than in 
Scully's original results (Table 2). 
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TABLE 3 
Estimation of Respecified Salary Equation 
Using 1968-1970 Dataa 
Variable 
At Bats Share + lb 
Slugging Average+ lb 
Positive Slugger Residualc 
Negative Slugger Residualc 
Positive At Bats Departured 
Negative At Bats Departured 
Positive Slugging Average Departuree 
Negative Slugging Average Departuree 
Innings Pitched Share+ i
b 
Power Pitching Raf io + l 
Starter Ratio + l 
Positive Innings Pitched Departureg 
Negative Innings Pitched Departurg
g 
Positive Power Pitching Departure 
Negative Power Pitching Departureh 
Old Agei . 
Old Age Siuared1 Young Age . 
Young Age Squared1 
• 
Positive Experience Residuall. 
Negative Experience Residual l 
Hopeful
k 
Rookie 
No Last Yearm 
Pitchern 
Constant 
R2 
Degrees of Freedom 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
Hodel !. 
11.04 (11.67) 
. 932 (2.25) 
.424 C.047) 
.987 (l .18) 
.043 (3.06) 
.031 (l.98) 
.957 (l .11) 
-1.204 (2.53) 
9.236 (9.54) 
.357 (3.29) 
-.601 (4.79) 
.007 (0 .37) 
.010 (0.53) 
.030 (0.32) 
. 191 (l .50) 
-.014 (0.21) 
.052 ( 1.69) 
.219 (2.66) 
-.218 (4.96) 
-.059 ( l. 76) 
.237 (8.19) 
• 292 (2.69) 
.090 (l .21) 
• ooo (0.00) 
.112 (l.71) 
8.944 (75.76) 
.80 
435 
29.74 
Hodel II 
10.83 (U .87) 
1.156 (3 .29) 
.041 (3.51) 
.027 (2.05) 
. 855 (l.01) 
-1.126 (2.42) 
9.243 (9.96) 
.386 (3.90) 
-.588 (4.83) 
.032 (0.35) 
.204 (l.66) 
.045 (4.26) 
.228 (3. 19) 
-.221 (5 .42) 
-.061 ( 1.83) 
.236 (8 .26) 
.309 (3.33) 
.074 ( l  .16) 
-
.124 (l. 93) 
8.918 (89.29) 
.BO 
441 
29.87 
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TABLE 3 (cont'd) 
a. The dependent variable is the logarithm of player salary. All 
independent variables that are not dummies are also in logarithmic 
form. Logarithms of pitching variables are zero for hitters and vice 
versa for pitchers. Data sources are the same as in Table 2. 
b. These variables are the same as defined in Table 2, except that 
one baa been added to insure that all observations have strictly 
positive values, as noted in the text. 
c. The estimated relationship between slugging average and batting 
average was: 
SA • .042 + 1.25 BA, R2 .570. 
(2.35) (17 .5) 
The variable Slugger Residual is set equal to the predicted SA from the 
above equation minus the actual SA for hitters. If positive, then 
Positive Slugger Residual equals the residual plus one, and the 
logarithm of Negative Slugger Residual equals zero. If the residual is 
negative, then Negative Slugger Residual equals one plus the absolute 
value of'the residual and the logarithm of Positive Slugger Residual 
equals zero. 
d. Let At Bats Departure equal the difference between the hitter's 
share of team at bats last season and his career average share of team 
at bats. If positive, Positive At Bats Departure equals At Beta 
Departure plus one and the logarithm of Negative At Bats Departure 
equals zero. If negative, then Negative At Bats Departure equals one 
plus the absolute value of At Bats Departure and the logarithm of 
Positive At Bats Departure equals zero. 
e. Let Slugging Average Departure equal the difference between the 
hitter's slugging average last season and his career slugging average • 
Positive and Negative Slugging Average Departures are calculated in an 
identical manner as Positive and Negative At Bats Departure (see note d) • 
f, The ratio of lifetime games started to total lifetime pitching 
appearances. 
g. Let Innings Pitched Departure equal the difference between the 
pitcher's share of team innings pitched last season and his career 
average share of team innings pitched. Positive and Negative Innings 
Pitched Departures are calculated in an identical manner as Positive 
and Negative At Bats Departures (see note d). 
h. 
i. 
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TABLE 3 ( cont'd) 
Let Power Pitching Departure equal the difference between the 
pitcher's power pitching ratio last season and hie career average power 
pitching ratio. Again, for the calculation of Positive and Negative 
Departures, see note d. 
Age is represented as the deviation from the sample mean, which was 
28 years. If this deviation is positive, Old Age equals one plus 
the deviation while its logarithm is zero if the deviation is 
negative. Young Age equals one plus the absolute value of the 
deviation if the deviation is negative and the logarithm of Young Age 
is zero if the deviation is positive. Squared variables are the square 
of the logarithms of the age variables. 
j. The estimated relationship between experience and age was: 
k. 
1. 
m. 
n. 
EXP ER -16.8 + . 771 AGE, R2 .611. 
(20.0) (27.0) 
Let Experience Residual equal the predicted EXPER from the above 
equation minus the player's actual EXPER. Positive and Negative 
Experience Residuals are calculated in a manner identical to Positive 
and Negative Slugger Residuals ( see note c). 
If the player has less than five years of major-league experience 
and fewer than forty at bate in each season (bitters) or fewer than 
thirty innings pitched in each season (pitchers), then Hopeful equals 
one. Otherwise, Hopeful equals zero. 
If a player has one year in the major leagues with playing time in 
excess of the cutoffs in the preceding note in that season, Rookie 
equals one, and is zero otherwise. 
According to the cutoffs in note k for experience below five years, 
and for those with experience exceeding or equal to five years, No Last 
Year equals one if the player was not on a major-league roster the 
previous season. Otherwise, No Last Year equals zero. 
Pitcher equals one for pitchers, zero otherwise. 
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Many of the new variables, are also significant. Apparently when 
sluggers have a bad year it is regarded aa a negative signal in the 
salary determination process (estimated Negative Slugging Average 
Departure has a negative sign) .  Both Positive and Negative At Bats 
Departures are positively related to salaries. While the 
interpretation for players whose at bate share was increasing is clear 
Can improving player, on average) , for players with recent at bats 
below their career averages, the dominant factor ia moat likely an 
injury which need not detract from their long-run performance. For 
hitters, the failure to distinguish sluggers from banjo hitters is 
disappointing (Positive and Negative Slugger Residuals are both 
insignificant) . Regarding pitchers, the respecified model 
distinguishes relief pitchers from starters ( Starter Ratio 
significantly negative) . However, Innings Pitched Departure adda 
essentially nothing to the explanation of salaries. 
Our treatment of age and experience is generally successful. Age 
has the predicted effect, especially for the very young and old: 
youthfulness is detrimental to the salaries of the very young, in 
middle years age has relatively little effect, and age again becomes an 
important contributor to increased salary for older players. Players 
with long careers presumably have more lucrative outside earnings 
potential (broadcasting, acting, advertising, public relations) because 
of their fame, and accordingly, if a team wants to keep them, their 
salaries must exceed these opportunity costs. The experience residual 
also is significant, especially for players with more experience than 
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their age predicts ( Negative Experience Residual significantly 
positive) . Players who have less experience than their age indicates 
earn lover salaries (Positive Experience Residual significantly 
negative) . 
Finally, the various dummies that were intended to represent 
players with discontinuous playing histories proved to explain little. 
Only the ''Hopeful" variable is statistically significant; however, its 
magnitude is quite small . The same can be said for the Pitcher 
variable. 
The overall quality of the model is about the same as for Scully'e 
original formulation, despite the omission of the market measures. 
Moreover, nothing is lost in choosing Hodel II over Hodel I ( about .009 
on R2) ;  we reject the hypothesis that Hodel I provides a better fit. 
Comparisons between Hodel II and Scully's model (Table 2) are somewhat 
obscured by the data transformations used to produce the former. 
Coefficients of the continuous variables in Hodel II are not 
elasticities, as is usually the case for log-linear estimation. 
Moreover, Hodel II does not produce constant elasticities across the 
range of the independent variables . The salary elasticities of the 
independent variables are increasing in the magnitude of the variables, 
asymptotically approaching the estimated coefficient as the value of 
the independent variable approaches infinity . But this is rather 
academic, for the values of the primary performance variables--playing 
time shares, slugging average, power pitching ratio--can never become 
very large and, for all but the last, are definitionally lees than one. 
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Rising elasticities over the relevant range of the independent 
variables seems to us to be a desirable characteristic, for it is 
consistent with the results of the constant-elasticity model reported 
in Table 2 .  There, Scully'• 1ample of regulars produced higher 
elasticity estimates than did our aample . Thia sugge1t1 that 
elasticitiea rise with increasea in skill. Comparisons of elasticitiea 
between Table 2 and Hodel II in Table 3 can be made by calculating 
point elasticities in Hodel II for values of the independent variables 
that are likely to be observed . Table 4 shows a set of such 
calculations and comparisons. Each postulated value of the independent 
variable of interest, from which point elasticities are calculated, 
lies within the normal range for players who typically spend an entire 
season on a major-league roster .8 
The elasticity estimates for the two playing time variables 
exhibit the broadest variability in Hodel II. Elasticity ranges for 
both playing time variables (At Bats and Innings Pitched Shares) 
include the estimates obtained from the regressions in Table 2 .  I n  
addition, the elasticity estimates for both variables obtained from the 
Scully model using the Fort-Noll aample are quite close to the Hodel II 
estimates at the low end of the performance range, as would be expected 
from the nature of the sample. Innings Pitched Share baa the further 
property that the original elasticity estimate by Scully is essentially 
the same aa the elasticity estimate from Hodel II that arises when the 
variable takes the value of . 15, which correaponds to the mean of that 
variable in Scully's sample ( .14). 
19 
TABLE 4 
Salary Elasticity Comparisons• 
Salary Elasticity 
Scully Hodel b Hodel uc 
Variable 
At Bats Share 
Slugging Average 
Innings Pitched Share 
Power Pitching Ratio 
Scully Data 
1968-9 
.28 
1.07 
. 97 
.81 
Fort-Noll Data 
1968-9 1968-70 
.27 .27 
.48 . 37 
.28 .38 
.24 .11 
Chosen 
Value 
.02 
.05 
.08 
.30 
.40 
.50 
.03 
. 09 
.15 
.75 
1.25 
1.75 
1968-70 
.21 
.52 
.80 
.27 
. 33 
.39 
.27 
. 76 
1.21 
.17 
.21 
.24 
a. Entries are estimated elasticity of salary with respect to the
corresponding independent variable. Variables are defined in 
Table 2. 
b. Repeated from Table 2, these are the estimated coefficients 
from the Scully model applied to both sets of data. 
c. Calculated from Model II of Table 3. The elasticity, in general, 
for variables transformed by adding one is: 
� � - xb(x + ob-1 
y ox y 
xb(x + 1) b-1 • 
(x + l)b 
x 
b(�), 
where x is the independent variable, b is the regression coefficient, 
and y is the dependent variable. The elasticity is calculated by 
taking the exponent of the log-linear relationship. 
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The elasticity estimates from Hodel II for the other two 
performance variables, slugging average and power pitching ratio, are 
lover than those in Table 2 throughout the entire range of choaen 
alternative values. For the estimates of Scully's model using the 
Fort-Noll sample (Table 2) , the elasticity estimates are at the upper 
extreme of the range of feasible elasticities calculated from Model II. 
Slugging averages and power pitching ratios that in Hodel II would 
generate elasticities roughly comparable to these estimates from 
Scully's model using our data would pertain only to league leaders in 
those categories. The estimated elasticities from the Scully sample in 
Table 2 are so far above the range of feasible choices that in Hodel II 
they pertain only to record holders. 
In Model II, playing time elasticities are low for reserves (.2 to . 3) 
and near unity for regulars while elasticities remain low for the other 
performance measures over the entire range of player clasaif ication. 
These results hold for both hitters and pitchers. While salaries are 
essentially proportional to playing time for regulars, with some 
additional payment to sluggers and strikeout pitchers, playing time is 
leas important for players at the low end of the skill range. A 
twofold explanation is plausible. At the lover end of the salary 
scale, a dominant factor is simply payment of the mini.mum salary 
necessary to keep the player in professional baseball (or to meet the 
minimum salary limit established through collective bargaining). Many 
players in this salary range are on major-league rosters only part-time 
and their key to staying in the majors is in performing a specialized 
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role (e.g. pinch hit effectively against a right-handed fastbal l  
pitcher, o r  succeed a s  a relief pitcher against power-hitting right­
handed batters). At the upper salary ranges are the regulars ( stars) 
who draw fans beyond the importance of their performance to the outcome 
of the game, an element in the salary determination process that 
generally becomes more important as performance measures increase. 
Based on the analysis in this section, we reach the following 
conclusions. First, with a different sample than previously available, 
we find that the general qualitative predictions of the economic theory 
of wage determination in professional sports and the value of the 
original specification by Scully are confirmed. Second, with respect 
to our data, plausible respecificationa enable us to achieve 
explanatory power on a par with previous work while omitting the 
theoretical ly auspicious variables that measure market size. Third, 
the difference in the quantitative effects of playing time and direct 
performance variables, including those present in our model but not 
used elsewhere, mark our specification as both a plausible and 
important improvement. 
IV. THE EFFECTS OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
During the period covered by our data, both major leagues 
expanded. The American League added the Seattle Pilots (now the 
Milwaukee Brewers) and Kansas City Royals in 1969 while the Montreal 
Expos and San Diego Padres began National League play in 1970. There 
are a number of reasons why expansion should affect the distribution of 
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player salaries. Assuming that expansion perceptively dilutes average 
player quality, major-league veterans of a given ability prior to 
expansion become more valuable. Even though veterans' absolute talents 
might remain constant, their talents improve relative to the new 
diluted level and, hence, so do contributions to the chances that their 
teams will fare well. Further, the label of "star" is in some respects 
a relative, not absolute, characteristic.9 For example, even though 
they may not be considered stars in the league at large, home fans 
grant star status to the one or two beat players on their team. 
Expansion, then, increases the number of players who will be regarded 
as stars by increasing the number of home-team partisans. On another 
front, the presence of minimum salary makes expansion place upward 
pressure on the entire salary structure. Although the minimum ability 
required to obtain a position on some major-league roster is lowered, 
the minimum salary requirement negotiated through collective bargaining 
does not decrease when expansion occurs. Analytical ly, the effect is 
similar to the consequences of raising the minimum wage while holding 
skills fixed, as examined by Scoville (1974) . Finally, the supply of 
players with sufficient talent to play major-league basebal l  is 
unlikely to be perfectly elastic. Even if it is technically possible 
to undertake an expansion that does not dilute average and minimum 
playing skills, such is likely to be achieved only at some increase in 
salaries. For all of these reasons, expansion should not be expected 
to leave the salary determination process unaffected; for players of 
all abilities, expansion should lead to higher sa laries. 
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The regressions reported in the previous two sections of the paper 
are baaed upon pooled samples of salary observations taken from years 
in which expansion occurred . In this section, we consider two issues: 
whether pooling data from these years is a statistically acceptable 
procedure and whether expansion had identifiable effects on salary 
determination . It turns out that the two issues are not independent . 
To examine the first issue, separate regressions for Hodel II were 
run for each of the sample years 1968 ,  1969, and 1970. Table 5 reports 
the results of these and two other estimations, one for pooled 1968-69 
observations and one for pooled 1969-70 observations . The procedure 
used to teat pooling is the standard method using F-teata (for example, 
see Haddala (1977]) . Table 6 shows calculated and critical F-valuea 
relevant to all the possible pooling questions .  Pooling is rejected in 
all cases. The result that the three sample years do not conform to a 
aingl� model lends empirical support to the theoretical argument that 
expansion significantly affects the salary determination process . The 
pooling of observations to estimate the models reported in Tables 2 and 
3 is not supported statistically. Consequently, we regard the 1968 
regression in Table 5 as the pre-expansion estimation while the 1969 
and 1970 regressions in that table are taken to represent different 
states of adjustment for the post-expansion industry. 
Inspection of Table 5 provides some insight into the elements of 
Hodel II that were and were not stable during the expansion period . 
Career performance variables generally are quite stable: the 
coefficients for at bats share, slugging average, power pitching ratio, 
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TABLE 5 
Estimation of Hodel II with Unpoo1ed Dataa 
Variable 
At Bats Share +l 
Slugging Average +l 
Pos. At Bats Departure 
Neg . At Bats Departure 
Pos. Slug. Ave. Depart . 
Neg. Slug . Ave. Depart. 
Innings Pitched Share +l 
Power Pitching Ratio +l 
Starter Ratio +l 
1968 
8.862(4.29) 
1.230(1.58) 
. 049(1.92) 
.041 (1. 38) 
.540(0.25) 
-.092(0.11) 
9.295 (4.00) 
. 280(1.15) 
-.531Cl.85) 
Poa. Power Pitch . Depart . -.145(0.73) 
Neg . Power Pitch . Depart . -.338(0.98) 
Old Age Squared . 069(3. 31) 
Young Age . 344(2.08) 
Young Age Squared -.302(3.16) 
Pos. Experience Residual -.097(1.33) 
Neg. Experience Residual .253(3.99) 
Hopeful .218(1.00) 
Rookie .248(1.59) 
Pitcher . 314(2.15) 
Constant 8.770(37 .7)  
R2 .81 
Degrees of Freedom 96 
Residual Sum of Squares 7.79 
-
1969 1970 
11.93 (8.15) 10.64 (7.81) 
.830(1.36) 2 .010(3 .89) 
.067 (3.45) . 016(0.86) 
.052(2.61) .002(0.07) 
3 . 010(1.61) . 042(0.04) 
-2 .340(3 .53) .455(0 . 38) 
9 . 517(6.20) 9.875(7.24) 
.519(3 . 09) .504(3 .29) 
-.700(3.80) -.600(3.07) 
. 039(0.32) .457 (1.88) 
.079(0.38) . 317(1.93) 
.053(3.37) .021(1.06) 
.174(1.54) .204(1.86) 
-.195(2. 97) -.190(3.10) 
-.065(1.20) -.029(0.57) 
. 236(5. 31) .207(4.78) 
.469(2.91) . 363(2.70) 
.182(1.90) -.202(1.96) 
-.002(0.02) .102(0.97) 
8. 911 ( 53 .8) 8.841(60.5) 
.84 .83 
146 159 
7 .92 9.30 
a. Estimates of the model in Table 3 for indicated subsets of the 
sample. Variables are as defined in Table 3 and t-atatiatica 
appear in parentheses. 
1968-69 
10.79 (8.93) 
. 884(1.82) 
. 053(3.42) 
. 040(2.34) 
1.850(1.35) 
-1.130(2.15) 
9.295 (7.26) 
.427(3 .11) 
-.624(4.03) 
-.016(0.15) 
-.052(0.28) 
.056(4.47) 
.239(2.53) 
-.241(4.41) 
-.063(1.46) 
.251(6 .80) 
. 367 (2.83) 
.223(2 .69) 
. 085(1.03) 
8.889(64.8) 
.80 
262 
17.94 
1969-70 
11.55 (11. 72) 
1.263 (3 . 32) 
.044 (3.45) 
.030 (2.08) 
.505 (0.56) 
-1.773 (3.18) 
9.642 (9.52) 
.468 (4 .42) 
-.643 (4.78) 
.102 (0.98) 
.253 (2.00) 
. 036 (2.94) 
.209 (2.71) 
-.204 (4.64) 
-.057 (1.57) 
.227 (7 .33) 
. 387 (3. 92) 
.009 (0.13) 
.065 (0.96) 
8.912 (83.3) 
.82 
325 
19.06 
� Pooledb 
1968 and 1969 
1969 and 1970 
1968-69 and 1970 
1968 and 1969-70 
1968 through 1970 
TABLE 6 
F-Tests for Pooling Validity& 
Critical !..c 
1.62 
1.61  
1.60 
1.60 
1.42 
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Calculated !..d 
1.72
1.64 
2.03 
2.74 
1.97 
a. Critical and calculated values of the F-statialic for testing 
whether the given subset can be pooled . The null hypothesis is 
that the coefficients in the stated years are equal. 
b. The years refer to observation subsets . The estimated equations 
used for the teats are those in Table 5, plus the equation applied 
to the entire sample, 1968-70, reported as Model II in Table 3. 
c.  The values of F (n,d) from tables of the F-distribution, n • degrees 
of freedom in the numerator and d • degrees of freedom in the 
denominator. If the calculated F exceeds the critical value, pooling 
is rejected at the .05 level .  
d .  Calculated i n  the standard fashion: 
F - (RSS
P 
- ass.> I (DFP - DFS) 
ass1 I DF1 
where RSS indicates the residual sum of squares, DF indicates 
degrees of freedom, p indexes the pooled regression, and s indexes 
the separate regressions . 
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and starter ratio are stable and usually significant by conventional 
standards. Stable as well are the age and experience variables, 
including the previously discussed inverse relationships between salary 
and experience residual although the effect is much stronger for 
players who are more experienced than their age would predict (Negative 
Experience Residual) . 
Not surprising is that the unstable elements in Model II include 
the variables measuring the departures from usual, or average, 
performance. Thia result is intuitively plausible. The predictive 
power of the previous year's performance, relative to a player's 
historical average, must surely be affected by a change in the league-
average skill level owing to expansion .  In addition, except for the 
Hopeful variable during post-expansion, the various dummy variables are 
unstable . Moat notable among these is the Rookie variable which is 
approximately equally significant between 1969 and 1970 ,  but changes 
sign between the two years. 
In an attempt to eludicate expansion effects statistically, we 
took the following approach. Most player• on expansion teams are 
selected from among major-league reserve players and minor-league 
rosters . Renee, the performance variables of expansion players--
especially playing time variablea--are likely to have a different 
meaning in the salary determination process than the same variables 
will have for players on established teams . After all, even a team of dregs 
must elevate some players to the status of regulars . Renee, in the 
Fort-Noll sample, we separated players who finished a given season 
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playing for an expansion team from those players that did not, i.e. we 
did not count players who were "just passing through" an expansion team 
as expansion players. We then reeatimated Model II allowing both the 
intercept and slope parameters to vary according to whether or not the 
player was an expansion player as follows: 
ln (salary) • 'ii + D<; + B'X + y'DX + u. 
The as are constant terms, X is the vector of independent variables, Ba 
and Ya are coefficients, u ia the error term, and D equals one if the 
player ia an expansion player (zero otherwise). The teat ia simply to 
determine whether the set of Y coefficients, the difference between 
expansion players and others, add significantly to the explanatory 
power of Model II and, individually, are significantly different from 
zero. 
The results appear in Tables 7 and 8. There were 55 expansion 
players in the 1969 sample and 35 in 1970. The first table ia the full 
expansion characterization of Model II in Table 3 while the latter 
reports a trinmed version. Baaed on F-teats (using an unreported 
pooled expansion characterization for the entire sample, 1969-7 0) , the 
following two results were found using the first two columns of Table 
7: (1) the expansion characterization of Model II revealed that the 
expansion variables were statistically significant in 1969 but not in 
1970 and (2) even with the expansion characterization, pooling of the 
1969 and 1970 ia invalid. 
The rationale for the trimmed version of the expansion 
Variable 
At Bats Share +l 
Slugging Ave. +l 
Poe. At Bats Depart. 
Neg. At Bats Depart. 
Poe. Slug. Ave. Depart. 
Neg. Slug. Ave. Depart. 
Innings Pitched Share +l 
Power Pitching Ratio +l 
Starter Ratio +l 
Poa. Power Pitch. Depart. 
Neg. Power Pitch. Depart. 
Old Age Squared 
Young Age 
Young Age Squared 
Poa. Experience Residual 
Neg. Experience Residual 
Hopeful 
Rookie 
Pitcher 
Constant 
R2 
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TABLE 7 
Expansion Characterization of Model Ila 
1969 1970 
Expansion Other Expansion 
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
-6.880(1.97) 13.140(7.�7) 3.131(0.74) 
.405(0.30) .816Cl .ll) -2.070(1.43) 
-.065(1. 7 1) .095(3. 7 2) .119(1.48) 
-.045(0.86) . 073(3 .08) .052(0.56) 
-3.650(0.16) 3.068(1.68) 3.188(0.63) 
3 .379(1.67) -2.847(4.15) -1.127(0 .33) 
-11.110(3 .02) 12.380(7 .10) 2.851(0.56) 
.151(0.44) .506(2. 40) -.329(0.29) 
.762(1.89) -.914(4.28) .147(0.23) 
-.034(0.13) -.027(0.17) -.813(1.12) 
.579(1.33) -.060(0.20) -.950(1.31) 
. 066 (1. 41) . 043(2.64) .061(1.14) 
.125(0.54) . 141(1.03) .027(0.08) 
-.016 (0. 12) -.205(2.53) .004(0 . 02) 
. 016(0.14) -.042(0.69) -.140(0.90) 
. 063(0.67) .235(4.69) -.247 (1.66) 
-. 219(0. 65) . 5 88(2.91) -.175(0.17) 
-.572(2. 94) .534(3 .87) .599Cl .52) 
-.006(0.03) .037 (0.31) .393(0.35) 
.181(0.49) 8.771(44.1) .028(0.05) 
.88 .86 
Degrees of Freedom 
Residual Sum of Squares 
126 139 
5 .94 
a. Aa described in the text. Variables are defined in Table 3 and 
t-atatiatica are in parentheses. 
b. Coefficient estimates pertaining to players who are characterized 
aa expansion players, aa described in the text. 
c. Coefficient estimates for the sample aa a whole. Again, the 
technique ia described in the text. 
7.73 
Other 
Coefficient a 
10.230(6.49) 
2.158(4. 04) 
.010(0 .49) 
. 012(0.50) 
-.487(0.42) 
.856(0.63) 
9.327(6.19) 
.616(3.86) 
-.558(2.54) 
.637(2.29) 
.485(2.84) 
.000(0.02) 
.195(1.60) 
-.176(2.57) 
. 018(0.31) 
.242(5 . 07) 
.428(3.03) 
-.239(2.16) 
.087CO .80) 
8. 703(53.8)
TABLE 8 
Trimmed Expansion Characterization& 
Variable 
At Bats Share +l 
Slugging Ave. +l 
Poe. At Bats Depart. 
Neg. At Bats Depart. 
Poe. Slug. Ave. Depart. 
Neg. Slug. Ave. Depart. 
Innings Pitched Share +l 
Power Pitching Ratio +l 
Starter Ratio +l 
Poe. Power Pitch. Depart. 
Neg. Power Pitch. Depart. 
Old Age Squared 
Young Age 
Young Age Squared 
Poe. Experience Residual 
Neg. Experience Residual 
Hopeful 
Rookie 
Pitcher 
Constant 
R2 
Degrees of Freedom 
Residual Sum of Squares 
1969 
Expansion Other 
Coefficientsb Coeff icientsc 
-7.705 (2.42) 13.670(8.76) 
.658Cl . 03) .718(1.20) 
-.053(1.52) .086(3.54) 
-.046Cl .04) .067(2.93) 
- 2.97 8(1.67) 
3.817(2.41) -2.850(4.26) 
-7 . 946 (2.93) 11.680(7 .23) 
- .57 0(3 .49) 
.698(1.88) -.936(4.46) 
. 039(0. 16) -.041(0.27) 
.640(1.50) -. 126 (0.44) 
• 041(1.10) .046(2.97) 
- . 194(1.80) 
- -.214(3 . 42) 
- -. 044(0.89) 
.059(0.76) .239(5 .15) 
- .498(3. 15) 
-.427(2.72) . 450(3.63) 
- .012(0.14) 
. 182(2.32) 8.789(53.7)  
.88 
133 
6.13 
29 
1970 
Expansion Other 
Coefficients Coefficients 
2 .287(0 .69) 10.140(6.59) 
-1.816 (2.12) 2.537(4.28) 
.081 (1.66 ) .011 (0.58) 
. 026(0.43) .01 3(0.55) 
- -.371 (0.34) 
-1.574(0 .62) .903(0.68) 
2.480(0.77) 9.403(6.41) 
- .602(3 .97 ) 
.249(0 . 47 )  -.522(2.56) 
-1. 1 43(1.80) .633(2. 33) 
-1.410(2.77) .492(2.95) 
.063 (1.64) .002(0.07) 
- . 194( 1. 76) 
- -.176 (2. 87) 
- -.001 (0.0l) 
�. 132(1 .30) .232(5 .08) 
- .446(3.36) 
.491(1.68) -.221 (2 .07) 
- .099(0.95) 
.090(0. 83) 8.705(57.9) 
.86 
146 
7.84 
a. Trimmed according to the omitted variables, due to multicollinearity 
problems described in the text. 
b. See note b, Table 7.
c. See note c, Table 8. 
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characterization for Model II is as follows. In the 1970 estimation of 
the full expansion characterization, the presence of individually 
significant expansion variables that, taken as a group, are no longer 
significant is a distinct indication of acute multicollinearity. This 
problem may be especially serious for precisely those player• that the 
expansion characterization is designed to handle�major-leaguer• with 
marginal skills. Lacking more data, the standard remedy for such 
problems is to drop variables. The result is shown in the last two 
columns of Table 7. 'llhile pooling is still disallowed under the 
trimmed version of the expansion characterization, we do find that 
expansion variables are statistically significant for both 1 969 and 
1970 • 
These results, gleaned from distinguishing expansion players, 
provide evidence that our respecified model (Model II) has captured 
important aspects of the salary process. We believe that the following 
additional evidence is the clincher. When an expansion 
characterization of the original Scully model (as just discussed for 
Model II) is applied to the Fort-Noll sample (1 96 9 ,  1970, and pooled 
1969-7 0) , one finds that: (1) expansion effects are not statistically 
significant in either 1969 or 1970, and (2) pooling remains valid for 
the Scully model, even under the expansion characterization. These 
results hold for both hitters and pitchers. Thus, the respecified 
model, but not the Scully model, enable us to detect the effect of 
expansion on salary structure: players on expansion teams are paid 
according to a different pay-performance relationship than our players 
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on established teams. Unfortunately, we cannot be very specific about 
exactly how these structures differ, except to point out that most of 
the expansion coefficients in Table 8 are negative, implying the 
obvious. Expansion players are generally paid leas than players of like 
histories on established teams. This is hardly surprising, of course, 
since the fact that a player was made available in an expansion draft 
is indicative of his value to the team that gives him up. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Using data that are more representative of the population of 
baseball players on major-league rosters and a respecif ication of 
salary determination that is both theoretically and empirically 
plausible, the following general results were obtained. First, the 
empirical models of the past, culminating in the work by Scully, are 
qualitatively but not quantitatively robust w�en applied to a different 
data set. Substantially less of the total salary variation in the 
Fort-Noll sample is explained by Scully's model than was explained in 
his original sample, and some important differences in the explanation 
itself emerge. Most notable among these differences is the overall 
reduction in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients (elasticities) 
and the change in the importance of the market size variables between 
the samples. We conclude that the salary determination process for the 
more general player population represented in our sample is different 
than the process for the more established players which dominate 
Scully's sample. 
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Second, our respecification of the salary relationship provides 
interesting insights. Roughly the same degree of explanatory power is 
achieved even though the theoretically auspicious market size variables 
are omitted from our model. Performance and playing time are just as 
important ae they have been in past studies, and a more detailed 
analysis of recent departures from averages of these variables yields 
additional explanation of the salary outcome. Relief pitchers are 
distinguished from starters, and the separate effects of age and 
ex�erience are untangled in a detailed fashion. Further, while salary 
elasticities with respect to playing time variables are close to those 
from Scully's model, the elasticities for the other performance 
variables are much lower than Scully's model would indicate from the 
sample at hand; only all-time great sluggers and strikeout pitchers 
would conform to the elasticities estimated from the Scully model. 
Finally, under an expansion characterization of our salary model, we 
find statistical evidence that changes in industry structure have a 
significant effect on player salaries. First, pooling observations 
across sample years is not statisticaly supported; the observations in 
separate years do not conform to a single salary model. Second, 
expansion players are statistically distinguishable from other players 
in both post-expansion years. While pooling these two years, even 
under the expansion characterization, remains invalid, the evidence 
str�ngly supports the hypothesis that expansion is the major cause of 
the inapplicability of a single salary model over the entire sample. 
The most important conclusion from the foregoing analysis is that one 
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must keep one's eye on the ball if one expects to hit it; studies of 
wage payments to players must take account of changes in industry 
structure if the endeavor is to provide a complete explanation of the 
pay-performance relationship. 
1. 
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FOOTNOTES 
The evidence generally supports the proposition that most teams 
maximize profits but that a few Cmost notably for our sample, 
the Boston Red Sox) are more aptly described as maximizing 
victories subject to a break-even revenue constraint (Noll, 1974). 
2. Several salary observations in our sample fall below the minimum 
major-league salary. The reason is that some transacted players 
were on minor-league rosters for all or part of the sample 
period. Although major-league teams have a 25""111an roster limit 
(until September 1), the teams actually have access to forty 
players. Owing to injuries, demotions to the minor-leagues, 
and late-season additions, nearly every player on the forty-man 
roster will play on the major-league team at some point during the 
season. The mean salary for the forty-man roster can be estimated 
by dividing the average payroll for players of major-league teams 
by forty. The result is an average salary between $25,000 and 
$30,000 during the sample period, based on data reported in Noll 
(1974), Chapter 1.
3. Two possible sources of sample bias in our data are: (1) salary 
observations are for players who were traded or sold and (2) most 
of our players are from the American League. We believe that 
neither problem is important. First, nearly all major-league 
4 .  
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players are transacted during their careers and, in any case, 
because we were supplied with player salaries for seasons in which 
the player was not subject to trade or sale, about half the salary 
observations are for players who were not transacted in the year 
of observation (Table 1). In addition, the neoclassical theory 
of the firm based on prof it-maximization predicts that the 
transfer of players from one team to another should not be 
correlated with their salaries. Players are subject to 
transaction when their marginal value products are higher in the 
new location than at the old, a circumstance unaffected by 
salaries paid by former teams (see El Hodiri and Quirk ( 1971),  
( 1974) ) .  Salaries should then determine the terms of the 
transaction, but not whether it takes pl•ce. If teams do not 
maximize profits, but instead maximize victories subject to a 
lower-bound constraint on net revenue, then players who, 
� post, are overpaid relative to their productivity wil l  
b e  more likely t o  b e  transferred from teams i n  relatively 
poor markets to teams in relatively better ones . Regarding the 
preponderance of American League players, we report below 
statistical analysis that finds no difference between American 
League and National League salaries . 
Logically, salary at time t depends upon performance up to time 
t-1 (i.e. last season); performance summary variables are 
calculated up to 1967 for 1968 salary observations and so on . 
5. 
6 .  
7. 
36 
In our definition of a baseball season, we set the beginning of 
a fiscal year at October 1, for that is approximately the end of 
the season. 
Population is a major factor influencing attendance, as shown in 
Noll (197 4), Chapter 4, and it is very likely to be highly 
correlated with Scully's marginal attendance estimate. 
Consequently, the t-values reported in both our sample and 
Scully'• for these variables are unreliable. Nevertheless, the 
estimates are more plausible in the regreseions on our data for 
both variables . First, the estimated coefficient• have the 
predicted positive sign. Second, if market characteristics have 
an effect on salaries, there is no theoretical reason to expect 
that the magnitude of the effect should differ aubstantial ly 
between pitchers and hitters. Indeed, in our sample, the 
magnitudes are close for the two player categories. 
Indeed, one single measure--playing time--seems to capture a large 
amount of the performance explanation. A rational team will 
naturally give more playing time to plsyPrs contributing most to 
the team. 
This transformation is not as innocuous as it might first appear. 
Some of the performance variables are ratios that take 
values near zero for all players (e . g .  at bat share) . Near zero, 
37 
the logaritlanic function haa much more curvature than it does near 
one, so that the data transformation is tantamount to a change of the 
assumption that the salary function ia highly nonlinear to an 
aaaumption of near linearity . 
8 .  Player• of atar caliber vould normally have statistics a little 
above the top of the range choaen , and marginal players vho are 
rarely used should have 1tati1tic1 lover than the bottom of the 
range. But the range is repreaentative of the vast majority 
9. 
of player1 ,  
For evidence on the independent effect of star statu1 ,  see Noll 
( 1 974) , Chapter 4. 
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